Ideas from 'Properties' by David M. Armstrong [1992], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Properties' (ed/tr Mellor,D.H. /Oliver,A) [OUP 1997,0-19-875176-1]].

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2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor

4036	What matters is not how many entities we postulate, but how many kinds of entities [Mellor/Oliver]

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties

15754

Without properties we would be unable to express the laws of nature

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates

4034	Whether we apply 'cold' or 'hot' to an object is quite separate from its change of temperature

8535	To the claim that every predicate has a property, start by eliminating failure of application of predicate

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes

8537	Tropes fall into classes, because exact similarity is symmetrical and transitive

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes

8538	Trope theory needs extra commitments, to symmetry and non-transitivity, unless resemblance is exact

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals

8539	Universals are required to give a satisfactory account of the laws of nature

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta

8529	Deniers of properties and relations rely on either predicates or on classes

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism

8532	Resemblances must be in certain 'respects', and they seem awfully like properties

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism

8530	Change of temperature in objects is quite independent of the predicates 'hot' and 'cold'

8536	We want to know what constituents of objects are grounds for the application of predicates

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism

8531	In most sets there is no property common to all the members

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism

15753

Essences might support Resemblance Nominalism, but they are too coarse and ill-defined

19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates

8533	Predicates need ontological correlates to ensure that they apply

4035	There must be some explanation of why certain predicates are applicable to certain objects

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory

8540	The introduction of sparse properties avoids the regularity theory's problem with 'grue'

8541	Regularities theories are poor on causal connections, counterfactuals and probability